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FOREWORD
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE:
ITS CHALLENGE TO THE PREVAILING
CONSTITUTIONAL PARADIGM
JOHN H. ROBINSON
Why, a reader might ask, has physician assisted suicide
emerged as a social problem at this point in history and why has
it proven so difficult for modem legal systems to provide a tolera-
ble solution to that problem? The same reader might wonder
what is to be done in the face of this difficulty. In this Foreword I
answer the first of those putative questions by suggesting that
death and dying are both in the throes of a massive revolution
these days and that it is that revolution that has given rise to ques-
tions about the acceptability of physician-assisted suicide. I
intend what I say there to be generalizable to the whole of the
technologically advanced area of the globe. My answer to the
second of those questions is confined to the difficulty that Ameri-
can legal systems, state and federal, have experienced in their
encounters with physician assisted suicide issues. In that answer I
suggest that the suicide question reveals a crisis in the current
constitutional order, a crisis from which American society will
have a difficult time extricating itself. In my answer to the third
of those questions, I argue that the current constitutional crisis
might offer American religious communities an opportunity to
rethink their relation to the secular culture in which they find
themselves and perhaps an opportunity to show that culture a
way out of the morass in which it finds itself.
I. DYING AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
Nothing is more natural for humans than the social con-
struction of conventions through which we humanize all that is
natural for us. So, while we are naturally linguistic, we realize
our linguistic capacity only through languages that are them-
selves shot through with convention, and while we are naturally
sexual, we need such highly conventional constructs as courtship,
marriage, and the family if we are to realize the human potential
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of our sexuality. We could say the same for-what meals do for the
hunger that our nature makes inevitable for us, and for what
clothing does for our natural need to protect ourselves from our
physical environment and for our equally natural desire to signal
our sex and status to those who come into view. After a while, we
could easily become so captivated by the ubiquity of those con-
structs as to think that they counted against our even having a
nature at all, but it is not the correction of that error that inter-
ests me here. My interest is in reflecting for a moment on how
deeply constructed dying is and has always been. My hope is that
this reflection will later help us to figure out how in the next
millennium dying ought to be constructed if we are to realize its
full human potential-paradoxical (and even ghoulish) as that
might sound.
Volumes of history must here ,be condensed into a few
paragraphs.' Three observations are in order here. First, until
only yesterday in historical time, death and its possibility were
everywhere. Women died during or just after childbirth in very
high numbers. Their children died within days or months of
birth in similarly high numbers. Men and women, boys and girls
were all highly susceptible to bacterial and viral conditions that
all too often led to death. Social and political instability made
war inevitable, and subsistence farming techniques often resulted
in widespread famine. Under these conditions, death was much
more central to life than it is today, as was the after-life about
which religion had so much to say.
The second observation is related to the first: not only was
death a central fact of life, but the medical response to the threat
of death was primitive and ineffective. Medical science was in its
infancy, reducing doctors to alleviators of pain and to peddlers of
worthless panaceas. What decent medical care there was was usu-
ally allocated to the wealthy and to the well born, leaving the vast
peasantry to shift for themselves. Under these conditions people
tended to be passive in the face of death, bowing to its inevitabil-
ity, and focusing on the glory that lay beyond it for those whose
lives had merited it.
The third observation relates more to dying than it does to
death itself. Dying was, for the most part, a domestic affair. Peo-
ple died at home in the company of their loved ones, attended to
more by the priest than by the physician. Under these condi-
tions, dying was not a social or political problem. For that to
1. See, e.g., PHILIPPE ARitS, WESTERN ATrITUDES TowARDs DEATH: FROM
THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT (1974).
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happen, revolutions had to occur both in death and in the pro-
cess of dying. It is to those revolutions that I now turn.
During the course of this past century, death itself has
undergone a massive revolution, at least in the technologically
advanced parts of the world. That revolution involved the dis-
placement of the family and the priest by the doctor as the basic
minister to the person suffering from some potentially lethal
condition. This displacement was achieved by the remarkable
success achieved by medical science in understanding and in
responding to those conditions that once were thought of as
beyond the reach of medicine. Cholera, typhus, diphtheria,
polio, tuberculosis, malaria, influenza, and syphilis all fell before
the advance of medical science. Even for those conditions for
which medical science has no cure, methods of control have
been developed, giving diabetics, epileptics, people with heart
conditions, and many cancer victims ways to lead normal lives
despite their inability to shake their condition entirely.
The revolution in death that I have just described brought
with it a revolution in dying that deserves brief attention here. As
the doctor replaced the family and the priest as the focal point of
the response to potentially lethal conditions, the hospital
replaced the home as the locus of death and dying. This revolu-
tion was surely abetted by other social phenomena-the break-
up of extended families and the entry of women into the extra-
domestic workforce, for example-but at its core was the revolu-
tionary assertion of power over disease by the medical profession.
Just as-and just when-house calls gave way to office visits for
routine illnesses, the family home gave way to the local hospital
for the treatment of potentially lethal conditions.
What all this history means is that one of our least visible and
most needed social constructs has, in the space of a single gener-
ation, virtually disappeared. In its place another construct is
slowly taking shape. But that new construct's emergence is tak-
ing much longer to occur than it has taken the old construct to
recede. So for the time being we find ourselves between con-
structs, nostalgically attached to the domestic death of recent
memory and understandably hostile to the medicalized death of
today. What are we to do during this interregnum and what role
should we play in the emergence of the new death construct?
For the crudest beginnings of an answer to those questions, let's
attend briefly to recent developments in American law regarding
death and dying.
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II. DYING AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY
For all those centuries during which medicine was almost
impotent against illness and accident, the common law quite
understandably addressed death primarily in its homicidal and
suicidal incarnations. Intentional homicide, if unjustified or
unexcused, was for the most part a capital offense,2 and suicide
was punished by ignominious burial and by the forfeiture to the
king of all the suicide's earthly possessions.' Of late, however,
American courts, like their English4 and Canadian5 counterparts,
have been almost obsessively concerned with the legal questions
raised by medicine's new found power over death,6 and in the
short space of twenty years, that obsession has proved to be singu-
larly productive.
Prescinding for the moment from judicial efforts to apply
the constitutional doctrine of decisional privacy to those ques-
tions, one could argue convincingly that competent individuals
can now find in the common law the legal wherewithal to fend
off unwanted medical attention, even where that attention is rea-
sonably believed necessary to their continued existence.7 Simi-
larly, one could argue convincingly that common law principles
combine with statutory provisions in most states to give binding
legal effect to living wills and health care proxy documents, espe-
cially where they specify that death-prolonging medical care not
be provided once its futility has become apparent.8 Even in the
absence of a document of that sort, the oral expression of a
desire not to be kept alive by mechanical means once one's com-
petence to speak for oneself is irretrievably lost will also be
respected provided that certain indicia of seriousness attend that
expression.9 The removal of nutrition and hydration tubes from
the persistently vegetative is more problematic, morally at least,
than is the removal of respirators,1 and demands for aggressive
2. 4 WaLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *177, 202-03.
3. Id. at *190.
4. See Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] 1 All E.R. 821 (Eng.).
5. See Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 519 (1993) (Can.).
6. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (NJ. 1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
7. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994);
State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617
(Nev. 1990).
8. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
9. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
10. On the moral problems involved in the removal of nutrition and
hydration tubes from persistently vegetative persons, see, for example, Dennis
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medical care for the dying are also more problematic than are
demands that such care be terminated."
Partially because the common law does not provide answers
to these latter questions, and partially because there is a certain
inconclusiveness to even those answers that the common law
does provide, litigants have for several years now pressed for the
constitutional resolution of death and dying questions.12 Once
these questions receive their constitutional answer, it has been
thought, then, and only then, will they have been definitively
answered. It is at just this point, however, that we must acknowl-
edge that American constitutional law is in the midst of the deep-
est crisis in its history, and that efforts to constitutionalize issues
related to death and dying can only exacerbate that crisis. To
make that point clear, however, a few things need to be said
about predecessor crises in American constitutional law and
about how they were resolved.'
3
The genius of Chief Justice John Marshall, who presided
over the Supreme Court from 1801 until 1835, was that he was
able to establish both the hegemony of the national government
over the commercial life of the new American nation 4 and the
supremacy of the federal judiciary in constitutional matters 15
without provoking a crisis either for or within the new constitu-
tional order. Marshall's successors have not been as fortunate or
as astute as he was. From the accession of Roger Brooke Taney
in 1836 until today, crisis has been the normal condition of
American constitutional law. The first great crisis-the struggle
over slavery-had been built into the Constitution when the
Founders acquiesced in slavery's continued existence in full
knowledge of its moral repugnancy.16 That crisis festered for sev-
Brodeur, Is a Decision to Forgo Tube Feeding for Another a Decision to Kill? 6 ISSUES IN
LAW AND MEDICINE 395 (1991).
11. On this issue, see DANIEL CALLAHAN, W1AT KIND OF LIFE: THE LiMrrs
OF MEDICAL PROGRESS (1990). For an account of recent litigation involving this
issue, see Gina Kolata, Court Ruling Limits Rights of Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1995, at 6. That article discusses the case of Catherine F. Gilgunn, who died on
August 10, 1989, after her doctors issued a do-not-resuscitate order over her
family's objections. The jury in the Gilgunn case returned a verdict in favor of
the defendant health care providers.
12. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988), for an early
instance of this phenomenon.
13. For an earlier effort on my part to think through the crises in
American constitutional history, see John Robinson, Jerny'sJeremiad, THE WORLD
AND I, March 1994, at 388.
14. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
15. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. See Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution: A Living Document, 30 How.
LJ. 623 (1987); but cf. Edward L. White III, Comment, Another Look at Our
1995]
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enty years before it exploded in the disastrous Dred Scott deci-
sion of 1857.17
No sooner had that crisis been resolved by war, by the bril-
liance of Lincoln, and by constitutional amendments that repudi-
ated the slave provisions of the original document,"' than a
second great crisis emerged. That crisis involved the role of the
state and federal judiciaries in overseeing the legislative regula-
tion of labor-management relations in the emergent industrial
centers of the nation. Because the fit between relevant constitu-
tional text and the constitutional crisis at issue here is singularly
odd and because that text will play a crucial role in two of the
next three crises that I shall be sketching, some attention needs
to be given to it.
In repudiating the original Constitution's acquiescence in
the evils of slavery, the Reconstruction Congress forbade the
states to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." 9 For the past 125 years judges and scholars
have struggled with what those words might mean. Rejecting the
eminently plausible suggestion that they might mean that states
must give people a fair trial before they deprive them of life, lib-
erty, or property by execution, imprisonment, or a fine, the
Supreme Court of a century ago interpreted those words to mean
that the states could not interfere with the liberty of workers and
employers to hammer out for themselves the conditions under
which the former would enter into or stay in the employ of the
latter.20 Similar language in the Fifth Amendment was held to
bar the federal government from interference of that sort as
well.21 In both cases, the Court reached this result by treating
the word "liberty" in "life, liberty, or property," as if it imposed
some substantive constraints on those human affairs about which
a legislature is constitutionally empowered to legislate. For that
reason this mode of constitutional thought goes by the awkward,
almost contradictory, name of substantive due process thinking.
Substantive due process thinking provoked a constitutional
crisis of a very different sort from the slavery crisis that preceded
it. As I have already noted, the slavery crisis was so tightly built
into the text of the Constitution that it could be resolved only by
Founding Fathers and Their Product: A Response to Justice Thurgood Marshal 4
NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 72 (1989).
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
18. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 1.
20. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
21. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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both a national change of heart and a series of constitutional
amendments. The substantive due process crisis of a century ago
did not originate in the text of the Constitution as then
amended. It originated in extra-constitutional theories of prop-
erty and labor relations, theories that we might loosely describe
as social Darwinist. For as long as those theories were widely
adhered to in society at large, substantive due process thinking
provoked no constitutional crisis, but once they lost popularity
among both the educated elite and among the laboring masses,
then the constitutional crisis emerged. When those theories col-
lapsed under the weight of social reality and vigorous conceptual
criticism, the crisis was resolved without the language of the con-
stitutional text having to be changed at all. From 1937 until
today, mainline constitutional theory has simply stopped reading
into the word "liberty" in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments any significant constraint on the power
of government to regulate labor-management relations,2 2 and, as
a constitutional matter, labor relations no longer produce a crisis
for American law at all. Much of the useful work that substantive
due process had done with respect to the constitutional regula-
tion of governmental regulation of private conduct is now done
under the aegis of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.23
In the same section of the Fourteenth Amendment in which
the Reconstruction Congress forbade the states to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, it
also forbade the states to deny to any person within their jurisdic-
tion "the equal protection of the laws."24 In this language too
there lurked a crisis, and that crisis is as different from the two
that I have just sketched as the second of them was from the first.
The first of those crises stemmed from the pact with hell that the
founders made back in 1787.23 It could be resolved only by
undoing that pact. The second crisis stemmed from the judici-
ary's commitment to certain social theories and not from any
requirement of the constitutional text. It could be resolved by
abandoning those theories and without touching the text. This
22. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. See William Lloyd Garrison, The American Unin, in SELECTIONS FROM
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 118 (1968), for the
most famous American use of this scriptural phrase. For the scriptural phrase
itself, see Isaiah 28:15.
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third crisis had, to be sure, an explicit constitutional focal point,
but it was not the text that caused the crisis. The crisis was
caused by deep and pervasive popular refusal to acknowledge the
profound moral requirement that was implicit in the text. That
requirement was that similarly situated persons ought to be
treated similarly by the state, and the refusal to acknowledge it
took the form of racism. From at least that day in June 1892
when Homer Plessy took a seat in a whites-only car on the East
Louisiana Railway26 until that day in May 1954 when the
Supreme Court held that the Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas, could not require Linda Brown to attend a blacks-only
public school,27 the nation was embroiled in its third great con-
stitutional crisis. This crisis, like its immediate predecessor, was
resolved without changing a syllable in the constitutional text.
What was changed was the national attitude towards race and
racism, and we find a monument to that change in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.28
At the core of the critique of racism, as racism was embodied
in law, was the perception that blacks and whites do not differ in
any legally relevant respects, such that for the state to collude in
the denial of housing,29 schooling,30 jobs,31 recreational facili-
ties," and the like on the basis of race is for it to violate the equal
protection of the laws that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pure reason conspired at this point with the irony
of legislative history33 to extend the victory won by blacks in
Brown and its progeny to women, and if women really did not
differ from men in any legally relevant respects, perhaps the cur-
26. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a, 2000a-2000h-6 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
29. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
30. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, (1970).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964). For the most recent development in the way in which
Title VII is applied in racially charged employment disputes, see St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
32. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358
U.S. 54 (per curiam), aff'g 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (public parks); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff'g 142 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 1956)
(buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (per curiam), vacating 223 F.2d
93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (per curiam), aff'g 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches).
33. See J.R. POLE, THE PuRsUrr OF EQuALrrY IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 316
(1978) for an account of how sex was added to "race," "religion," and "national
origin" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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rent constitutional crisis could have been averted. 4 But women
do differ from men in ways that the law must address, and in
addressing those differences the law inevitably encounters a
whole series of hard questions relating to the governmental regu-
lation of human sexuality; so the current crisis became virtually
unavoidable. To understand the nature and seriousness of that
crisis, we must return to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and to the mid-twentieth century effort to
give it meaning.
Once substantive due process thinking had been swept from
the constitutional scene, several efforts were made to fill the void
created by its removal. One of the most promising of these
efforts was led by Justice Hugo Black. His effort promised to give
the federal judiciary substantive power over state legislation with-
out making the Due Process Clause hostage to the socio-political
views of the judiciary. Justice Black read that clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as subjecting the states to the substantive
restraints on legislation expressed in the first eight amendments
to the federal Constitution, thereby requiring the states to honor
in their legislation all of the constraints that were built into the
Bill of Rights as constraints upon the federal government.
35
Justice Black's effort was too much for some, 6 too little for
others, 7 and troublesomely incoherent to all.3" In any case, his
effort failed, and the effort led first byJustice Harlan and later by
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens succeeded.
According to that effort, the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is not "a series of isolated points pricked out in
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press,
and religion,"39 as Justice Black would have it. It is instead "a
rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
34. The early women's rights cases were predominately of this equal
treatment variety. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
But when this mode of analysis was applied to pregnancy issues, it became
problematic. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976);
Gedulgig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
35. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 53 (Reed J., writing for the majority).
37. Id. at 123 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
38. The incoherence stemmed fromJustice Black's attempt to predicate a
rigidly textualist approach to constitutional interpretation upon a patently non-
textualist interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
39. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints."40
Now since one person's "arbitrary imposition" is another
person's "rational regulation" some way of giving substance to
Justice Harlan's approach had to be found. After a brief flirta-
tion with penumbras, formedby emanations, that create consti-
tutionally protected zones,41 the Court settled into a significantly
more pedestrian way of giving content to Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty. Nowadays a practice is rebuttably protected from
legislative prohibition if it is either "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"4" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."43 From the outset, Justice Black warned that neither
of these criteria for the constitutional unacceptability of state or
federal legislation could perform the function that the Court had
assigned to them; viz., permitting the Constitution and its his-
tory-as distinguished from the policy preferences of the current
members of the federal judiciary-to determine the conditions
under which the will of the majority, as embodied in legislation,
would be thwarted by judicial review.44 Evidence for the appro-
priateness of Justice Black's warning was provided first by the
abortion cases of the 1970s, then by the sexual orientation cases
of the 1980s and 1990s.
Whatever one thinks about abortion or about gay rights as
matters of substantive social policy, he or she is compelled to
acknowledge that the case law in those areas lacks both the tex-
tual and the theoretical warrants that give, say, integrationist case
law its stability. Such stability as the plurality opinion in Casey was
able to provide for current constitutional abortion doctrine, for
example, was explicitly separated from any attempt to justify that
doctrine on textual or theoretical grounds,45 and no body of case
law could be more incoherent than the tangle of recent state and
federal cases on gay rights.' This incoherence is not due to the
40. Id.
41. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
42. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
43. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
44. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-527 (Black, J., dissenting). See also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-386 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, D.).
46. Compare Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855/3973/4280, 1995 WL 276248 (6th Cir. May 12, 1995)
(upholding constitutionality of a ballot measure that forbade Cincinnati to
regard sexual orientation as a predicate for protection under anti-
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stupidity or to the wickedness of the judicial figures who have
produced these decisions. Far from it-we can safely assume
that each of those figures has striven valiantly to do just what the
constitutional law on decisional privacy requires him or her to
do. The trouble is that no one can do what that body of law
requires him or her to do. No one, that is, can determine
whether or not a particular practice is so thoroughly implicated
in the concept of ordered liberty or so deeply rooted in the
nation's history as to be above restrictive regulation without
insinuating his or her own policy preferences into that calcula-
tion. As a result, the case law in this area breaks down into two
irreconcilable parts: one part insists that the entire exercise puts
the judicial process itself in jeopardy;47 the other part naively
constitutionalizes the loosely Millian preferences of the current
judicial elite.4' To say the least, this is not a formula for the con-
stitutional resolution of vexing social problems. It is instead a
formula for the trivialization of the entire constitutional enter-
prise. Let the recent effort to find a constitutional solution to
the problem of physician assisted suicide serve as an example of
what I mean.
In December 1993, Richard C. Kaufman, a trial court judge
in Michigan, determined that the constitutional law of decisional
privacy includes, in some circumstances at least, a right to com-
mit suicide.4" Predictably, Judge Kaufman reached his conclu-
discrimination laws) with Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (finding a substantially identical measure
unconstitutional). Similarly, compare Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (the Navy may use sexual orientation as a predicate for exclusion from
the Naval Academy and from service in the Navy) with Able v. United States, No.
94 CV 974, 1995 WL 149460 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1995) (a federal law and
directives issued pursuant to that law are unconstitutional insofar as they permit
the military to predicate dismissal from the military upon a person's
acknowledgement of his or her sexual orientation).
47. See id. at 194 ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution."). See also
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-301 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
48. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (" '[T]he
concept of privacy embodies the "moral fact that a person belongs to himself
and not others nor to society as a whole."'" (quoting Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
concurring))).
49. People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 13, 1993), revd sub nom. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd in part and revd in part sub nom. People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3692 (U.S.
Apr. 24, 1995) (No. 94-1490).
19951
356 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
sion by asking himself if suicide has either the historical or the
conceptual warrant required by decisional privacy law.5 ° Finding
the historical inquiry to produce a "murky" result,5" he turned to
the conceptual issue-viz. "whether the right to commit suicide
is ever part of. the implicit concept of ordered liberty."52 In this
inquiry,Judge Kaufman was guided by the assertion of the plural-
ity in the then-recent Casey decision to the effect that "the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life" lies at the heart of the
liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against intrusive
governmental regulation.55 Using this assertion as his guide,
Judge Kaufman was easily able to conclude that suicide decisions
deserve to be added to sexual decisions as among the sorts of
decisions implicated in this concept of ordered liberty. 54 All that
was left for him to do was to decide that, in some cases at least,
the state's countervailing interest in proscribing suicide fail to
trump a particular person's right to die,55 and he was free to
invalidate Michigan's prohibition on assisted suicide, at least as
that prohibition applied to the case before his court.56
One year later the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
decision that I have just sketched. 7 Speaking for a majority of
his court on this point, Justice Cavanagh found the historical
inquiry mandated by the decisional privacy cases to be far from
murky. He found instead a long and clear history of societal and
legal disapproval of suicide, a history that includes the criminal-
ization of assisted suicide by sixty percent of the states that rati-
fied the Fourteenth Amendment.58 As for the claim that a right
to suicide is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, Justice
Cavanagh argued both that the argument for that claim was
internally incoherent and that by proving too much it proved
nothing at all.59 The incoherence, Justice Cavanagh thought, lay
in the conflict between the dignitarian presuppositions of all
autonomy-based claims and the violation of human dignity
implicit in any effort to measure the value of a person's life by
50. Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212 at *8.
51. Id. at *13.
52. Id. at *13.
53. Id. at *13 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2807 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J1.)).
54. Kevorkian, 1993 WL 603212 at *18.
55. Id. at *19.
56. Id. at *20.
57. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3692 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995) (No. 94-1490).
58. 527 N.W.2d at 730-33.
59. Id. at 727 n.41.
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reference to the current state of that person's mind or body.6"
The tendency of the argument to prove too much, and therefore
to prove nothing, stems from its linkage of a suicide right to
autonomy; if the argument works, Justice Cavanagh thought,
then every autonomous person would have a rebuttable right to
suicide, but this, he thought, is a conclusion that even the advo-
cates of a suicide right are at pains to reject.6 ' Justice Cavanagh
dismissed as unpersuasive the efforts of the dissenters to employ
a balancing test to determine the class of persons whose interest
in a painless and prompt death outweighs the countervailing
interests that ordinarily militate in favor of a prohibition on one
person's giving another assistance in dying.62
While this constitutional drama was being played out in
Michigan, a parallel phenomenon was occurring on the West
Coast. In May 1994, Barbara Rothstein, the Chief Judge of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton, found in the Due Process Clause, as it has been interpreted
by the decisional privacy cases, a constitutional right whereby
"adults who are mentally competent, terminally ill, and acting
under no undue influence" are entitled "to voluntarily hasten
their death by taking a lethal dose of physician-prescribed
medicine.""3 As had Judge Kaufman in Michigan five months
earlier, Judge Rothstein predicated this finding on the Casey plu-
rality's claim that "the right to define one's own concept or exist-
ence, or meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life" lies at the heart of the liberty that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects from intrusive governmental regulation. 6' By way
of this understanding of the scope of the Due Process Clause,
Judge Rothstein was able to analogize suicide decisions to abor-
tion decisions inasmuch as each involves "the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime."65 With that
much done, all Judge Rothstein had to do was to deny the consti-
60. "In this regard, we observe that a right of personal autonomy cannot
exist independent of a recognition of human dignity, and that it would violate
the concept of human dignity to measure the value of a person's life by that
person's physical and mental condition." Id.
61. "Further, because all persons possess a basic right to personal
autonomy, regardless of their physical or mental condition, there would be no
principled basis for restricting a right to commit suicide to the terminally ill.
The inevitability of death adds nothing to the constitutional analysis." Id.
62. Id. at 727 n.37.
63. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
64. Id. at 1459 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2807 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.)).
65. Id. at 1462.
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tutional significance of the distinction between the termination
of life-sustaining medical treatment and the prescription of a
lethal dose of medication, and she was free to declare Washing-
ton's law against assisted suicide unconstitutional.66
By further analogy to the Michigan litigation, when a three
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal from Judge
Rothstein's decision, that panel reversed her decision. There
Judge John Noonan, speaking for the 2-1 majority, rejected
Judge Rothstein's attempt to use the "mystery of human life"
quote from the Casy plurality as a bridge between the constitu-
tional regulation of abortion laws and the constitutional regula-
tion of assisted suicide laws.68 As had the Michigan Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit found any effort to base a suicide right
in a more general autonomy claim to prove too much, and hence
to prove nothing. As Judge Noonan said:
If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to believe and to
act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the righi to suicide
and the right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of
at least every sane adult. The attempt to restrict such rights
to the terminally ill is illusory. If such liberty exists in this
context, as Casey asserted in the context of reproductive
rights, every man and woman in the United States must
enjoy it. ... The conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum.69
The Ninth Circuit also rejected out of hand Judge Rothstein's
efforts to deny the constitutional significance of the distinction
between refusing life support and seeking medical help in
dying."0 Having done this, the Ninth Circuit found it easy to con-
clude that neither the language of the Constitution nor the his-
tory of its interpretation entails a constitutional right of the sort
that Judge Rothstein had so confidently asserted ten months
earlier.7 1
As I write this summary of these cases, the United States
Supreme Court has just denied certiorari in the Michigan case, 2
and the plaintiffs in the Washington case have sought en banc
66. Id. at 1467.
67. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1995 WL 94679
(9th Cir. Mar. 9, 1995).
68. Id. at *4.
69. Id. at *4.
70. Id. at *8.
71. Id. at *8.
72. Kevorkian v. Michigan, 63 U.S.L.W. 3692 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995) (No.
94-1490).
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review from the Ninth Circuit.73 My best guess is thatJudge Noo-
nan's decision will not be disturbed on review, but my objective
here is not to give reasons for that guess. My objective here is to
show that the argumentative process engaged in by Judge Kauf-
man in the Michigan case and by Judge Rothstein in the Wash-
ington case is, to paraphrase Robert Frost, "tennis without the
net."74 More precisely, the whole project of constitutionalizing
the resolution of a serious public policy dispute presupposes that
the text of the Constitution and the history of its interpretation
play a significant, indeed a definitive, role in how that dispute is
finally resolved. For the resolution of a dispute to be constitu-
tionalized, it must at least be imaginable that the Constitution
will run counter to the zeitgeist, checking momentary enthusi-
asms and calling the nation back to enduring ideals that have
been ignored in the desire to find a quick fix for some systemic
problem. But the decisional privacy cases of the past thirty years
have not been decided in that way at all. What has happened
instead is that the whole process of constitutionalization has
been debased in ways that cry out for correction if that process is
ever to function effectively and defensibly in the resolution of
policy disputes. Let me sketch some of the ingredients of that
correction here.
It is, of course, imaginable that the American legal system
would simply reject as indefensible any effort to predicate consti-
tutional constraints on legislative constraints on the substantive
liberty of the people upon the text and implications of the Due
Process Clause. Recent efforts to shift the constitutional warrant
for the extant abortion jurisprudence and for the emergent sui-
cide jurisprudence from the Due Process Clause to either the
Equal Protection Clause 75 or to the Religion Clauses76 suggest
the attractiveness of such a move even among prototypically lib-
eral theorists. My own suspicion is that neither of these shifts is
likely to be entirely successful both because of deep problems
inherent in both attempted shifts and because of the inherent
attractiveness of the highly selective libertarianism implicit in
current substantive due process doctrine. If my suspicion is well-
73. See Suicide Ban Ruling Appealed, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 10, 1995, at A8.
74. MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 227 (John Daintith et al.
eds., 1989).
75. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70
INDIANA L.J. 1 (1994). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985).
76. See, e.g., Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and The Freedom of Religin, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 490 (1992). See also RONALD DwoRKIN, LiWE's DOMINION
(1994).
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grounded, then the central constitutional project of the current
era ought to involve a thorough-going reconceptualization of the
whole idea of a constitutionally protected sphere of decisional
privacy. That reconsideration ought to issue both in a better nor-
mative foundation for that doctrine and in better procedures for
determining the outer limits of that sphere than current. deci-
sional law provides.
As to the first of those outcomes, the courts and their critics
will have to call into question the very idea that the touchstone
for the proper interpretation of the Due Process Clause, insofar
as it imposes substantive limits on the ability of a state to enforce
liberty-limiting legislation, is the right of every competent adult
to define his or her own "concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life."" While coming
to our own terms with the mystery of life may be necessary to
intellectual maturity, any suggestion that it somehow suffices to
ward off the interventionist state has an odd ring to it. Far from
clarifying the law of decisional privacy and showing us a way out
of the current crisis, it obfuscates that body of law and deepens
that crisis. Because of the crucial relevance of this assertion to
the whole question of a constitutional right to assistance in dying,
I will devote a paragraph here to its elucidation.
Insofar as a concept of existence functions as a reason for
action and as a constraint on state power, the government whose
power is thereby constrained should be entitled to at least two
desiderata. One is that that concept be to some extent authentic;
that is, that it be the product of a particular citizen's personal
reflection, and this the Casey dictum seems to acknowledge. But
a government should also be entitled to desire that a particular
citizen's concept be to some extent correct; that is that it bear
some positive relationship to existence, and on this Casey is tell-
ingly silent. It might appear ludicrous for a state to set itself up
as an arbiter of the correctness of concepts such as these, but it is
equally ludicrous for the state to feign indifference to those con-
cepts at the same time as it sets them up as the basis for the
constitutional doctrine of decisional privacy. In that indifference
lurks a specious neutralism that tends to enlist the state on the
permissive side of any dispute over the proper role of the state
with respect to the regulation of some form of human conduct.
If it is to free itself from such question-begging procedures, what
American constitutional theory needs to do in both its judicial
and its academic incarnations is to mediate the tension between
77. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (joint
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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an intolerable state imposition of certain alleged truths about
existence and the like and an equally intolerable deference to
the basic beliefs of individuals, however bizarre those beliefs hap-
pen to be.
This process of mediation will itself have at least two levels to
it. One will surely be empirical. Judges and scholars will have to
ask themselves what effect assertions of governmental neutrality
with respect to certain domains of human conduct have on the
way citizens act in those domains. Does governmental neutrality
with respect to the sexual lives of its citizens, for example, have
any causal relation to the collapse of family ties or to the level of
teenage promiscuity, with its incidental toll from AIDS and other
sexually transmitted diseases?78 Is it the case more generally that
efforts on the part of government to refrain from imposing one
among many contesting understandings of the good life are
always read by the general populace as an endorsement of the
most permissive of those understandings? Does governmental
neutrality with respect to competing conceptions of the good life
always become in practice governmental endorsement of moral
relativism and of a notion of happiness that substitutes the satis-
faction of episodic desire for the fulfillment of human potential?
Must respect for individual autonomy always subvert those inter-
mediate institutions that, arguably at least, give rise to an individ-
uality that deserves respect? If the answers to these questions are,
as I suspect they will be, of the highly qualified variety that good
empirical inquiry routinely produces, they will lead to even more
difficult questions about how governmental respect for auton-
omy will have to be rendered operational so as not to have the
dire effects intimated in the series of questions that I have just
asked.
As these empirical questions are being answered, other
more purely normative issues will have to be addressed if the cur-
rent constitutional crisis is itself to be resolved. Foremost among
these will be the articulation of a conception of the state that
connects its moral legitimacy to the respect that it exhibits for
the subjectivity of its citizens. H.L.A. Hart,7 9 John Rawls,8 ° Ron-
ald Dworkin,"' and Joel Feinberg8 2 are among those who have
78. On this question, see Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was
Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47.
79. See H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORLITY (1966).
80. SeJOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993);JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JusTICE (1971) (hereinafter RAwLs, JuSTIcE).
81. See DwoRKIN, supra note 76.
82. See JOEL FEINBERO, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw (1984-
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already made progress in this direction, but it would be foolish to
say that any one of them (or that all of them taken together)
have succeeded in that task. But even were that task to have been
completed, normative work would still have to be done on the
distinction between the state, as liberal theory conceives of it,
and the society that the liberal state governs. Here the worry is
that the requirement of moral neutrality that contemporary lib-
eral theory imposes upon the state will be transferred to those
social institutions that the liberal state inevitably relies upon for
the development of decent citizens. With this transference come
two evils. The first is the inability of those social institutions to
function as moral educators, and the second is the substitution of
a pernicious rationale for the neutrality of social institutions for
the valid rationale that grounds state neutrality.
Social institutions can function as moral educators only
when they are possessed of a much more determinate account of
the human good than modern liberal theory allows to the state.
Tolerance may be a necessary political virtue in heterogeneous
states, but it is far from sufficient as a guide to one's personal life.
And we can ground state neutrality with respect to at least some
range of conceptions of the good in relatively pure political the-
ory, arguing that the state is neither competent to function as a
moral arbiter nor licensed to function in that way. Such argu-
ments are ordinarily unavailable, however, when it comes to such
social institutions as the family, the school, the church, or one of
the professions. If we transfer to them the neutrality require-
ment that we impose on the state, we are likely to base this illegit-
imate requirement of social neutrality on wholly contemptible
and utterly corrosive relativistic grounds. So the political theory
that will be needed to resolve the current constitutional crisis will
have to be one that simultaneously justifies a state whose moral
agenda is self-consciously thin and a set of social institutions
whose moral agendas are unabashedly thick." As unproblematic
as this may sound in theory, in practice it may prove to be
immensely problematic, as becomes evident as soon as we con-
sider the whipsaw effect it is likely to have in the life of at least
some of the citizens of the liberal state. In the next section of
this Foreword I will first sketch that whipsaw effect, then I will
offer some potential responses to it.
83. The thick/thin imagery can be traced to RAwLS, JUSTICE, supra note
80, at 395-99.
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III. THE INDIVIDUAL AS CITIZEN AND AS BELIEVER
Imagine a particular individual who is simultaneously a citi-
zen of a liberal state and a congregant in a traditional Christian
church. As this individual understands the state in which he
lives, it urges him to work out his own concept of existence and
meaning for himself and to respect the product of others' efforts
along similar lines regardless of the ultimate accuracy of either
his efforts or theirs. As he understands his church, however, it
urges him to accept a divinely ordained concept of existence and
meaning and to shun those who embrace worldly ideals. This
individual hears his government tell him that it is a "moral fact"
that he "belongs to himself and not others,"84 but he hears his
church tell him that he belongs to God. The autonomy that his
state privileges when it speaks to him as a citizen begins to look
suspiciously like the pride that his church denounces when it
speaks to him as a believer.8 5 Worse yet, he understands his state
to identify the good with the satisfaction of desire but he under-
stands his church to identify the good with conformity to the will
of God. Consequently, he sees that his state expects him to maxi-
mize his own utility in any situation in which he might find him-
self, but he realizes that his church expects him to deny himself
in at least some of those situations. This sense that one is receiv-
ing contradictory instruction from two recognized authority sys-
tems is the whipsaw effect that I referred to earlier.
It may well be true that each of these tensions between what
the state tells the individual as citizen and what the church tells
that same individual as believer can be reconciled either by cor-
recting one or both of the messages in question or by reminding
the individual of the differential capacities in which he hears
those messages, but no one should be surprised to learn that
believers who are inept at or hostile to such fine distinctions
should have come to see the liberal state as their enemy.
8 6
When, furthermore, the focus shifts to the issue of assisted sui-
cide, the prospects for reconciliation diminish and the
schizophrenogenic potential of the liberal state increases. Let
me explain what I mean.
84. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
85. See David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Post-
Modern America: A Response to Professor Perny, 76 IowA L. REv. 1067, 1082 (1991)
(discussing St. Augustine's account of pride as the substitution of one's self for
God as the source of one's values).
86. On this rift between the liberal state and at least some religious
believers, see JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991).
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The liberal state, the state, that is, that numbers a commit-
ment to decisional privacy among its constitutional priorities, has
precious little to say about death and dying, but even that little
may sound odd to the believer. The liberal state, insofar as it has
anything to say about death and dying, is driven by its other sub-
stantive commitments to portray both death and dying in wholly
negative terms. For the state, death and dying involve both
reduced productive capacity and reduced interest in the satisfac-
tion of desire. For the believer, however, death marks the point
of entry into eternal life, and the diminishment that ordinarily
precedes death possesses an intelligibility, even a functionality,
that baffles secular consciousness. That diminishment invites the
dying person to overcome her pride and to open herself to the
holy. It witnesses to the deeper values that are obscured in the
rush of everyday life, and it rebukes our tendency to value others
solely for their accomplishments. It facilitates receptivity to the
care of others on the part of the dying person, and it provides an
opportunity for reconciliation between the dying person and her
family.
The diminishment that is incident to ordinary dying thus
functions for the believer and for her faith community as a
reminder of deep and easily overlooked Gospel truths-truths
about the vanity of the pursuit of money, a7 power,"" fame,89 and
pleasure,9" and truths about the fullness of life that awaits those
who reject the meretricious allure of that pursuit. Access to these
truths is, however, limited by the very nature of the Gospel
message. 91 Oversimplifying immensely, we can say of Jesus that
he set out simultaneously to affirm human life and to call into
question every assumption that we are inclined to make about
how to preserve and enhance that life.92 He often spoke as if
those assumptions got in the way of the human flourishing that
he so unabashedly endorsed.9 3 We act as if we knew what would
make us happy, and Jesus spoke as if he knew that we are wrong.
There is, therefore, a reversal of values implicit in the Gospels, a
reversal with which only the most saintly among us will ever be at
ease. Within Christian communities, believers can rely upon
their own and their fellow believers' inchoate appropriation of
that reversal of conventional values in their efforts to embody the
87. See, e.g., Matthew 6:19-21. Cf Matthew 5:3.
88. See, e.g., Matthew 20:24-28.
89. See, e.g., Matthew 23:5-12. Cf Matthew 5:11-12.
90. See, e.g., Matthew 5:27-30.
91. See, e.g., Matthew 13:11-16. Cf John 8:12-59.
92. See, e.g., Matthew 16:24-27. Cf John 12:24-25.
93. See, e.g., Luke 6:20-25.
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Gospel message in their lives. But in their dealings with secular
society, believers should expect those with whom they deal to be
sedulously committed to just those conventional values that the
Gospels urge the believer to repudiate.94 If we locate the believ-
ers whom we have been discussing here in contemporary Oregon
or in one of the states that is considering the legalization of phy-
sician assisted suicide, the implications of the limited accessibility
of the Gospel message for that issue should become clear.
In November 1994 the voters of Oregon passed a law that
permits doctors to prescribe lethal doses of medication to termi-
nally ill patients once doctor and patient have jumped through
the standard bureaucratic hoops.95 Several other states are con-
sidering measures similar to the Oregon measure. 96 In Oregon
several Christian confessions played leading roles in the cam-
paign against the assisted suicide ballot measure,.as they had, but
with more success, in earlier campaigns in California and Wash-
ington.97 In those campaigns, the Church was required by the
necessities of modern political life to phrase its hostility to
assisted suicide in predominantly secular language. They spoke,
therefore, of the slippery slope that leads from assisted suicide to
involuntary euthanasia, of the demoralization of the medical pro-
fession that might follow from the passage of laws that permit
doctors to offer formal cooperation in their patients' suicide, of
the need to protect the episodically depressed from a social cli-
mate that appears to accept suicide as a permissible way of deal-
ing with life's problems, and so on. In California and in
Washington, these arguments prevailed over the countervailing
argument for autonomous control over one's own death, but in
Oregon they failed.
What should the Church learn from the failure of its efforts
to resist Oregon's assisted suicide measure? To make better
arguments, to be sure, and to disseminate them more effectively.
But perhaps the Church should also learn that it is essential to
the Gospel message that it is more effectively conveyed by how its
94. See John 15:18-20.
95. For the text of Oregon's Death With Dignity Act, see OR Legis 3
(1995). For litigation related to this law, see Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491
(D. Or. 1994).
96. In recent years bills to legalize assisted suicide have been introduced
into the state legislature in California, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Oregon, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See Warren Wolfe, Several States Attempting to
Legalize Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide, [Minneapolis] STAR TUB., Feb. 27, 1994, at
17A.
97. See Bill Broadway, The Dilemma of Assisted Suicide: Clergy Generally
Oppose, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1994, at B6. See alsoJ.P. Kenney, The Suicide State,
FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1995, at 16.
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adherents live than by how they talk. While this may be true of
all normative messages, it is especially true of the Gospels in light
of the deep counter-conventional way of life that they prescribe.
When it comes to winning others over to that way of life, argu-
ment will get the believer only so far; the rest of the way will have
to be covered by the example of a life lived in conformity to the
teachings of Jesus. For my own part, I do not see this as a weak-
ness of the Gospel message; I see it instead as a strength. As
Christians discover how poorly the Gospel message translates
into secular argument, they may recover the power of Christian
witness. If this happens, we may find that the Church in Oregon
and in states that are considering following Oregon's example
affects the formation of public policy in those states more by how
well Christians come to terms with their own dying and with the
imminent death of the terminally ill in their communities than
by how well they use war chests to wage political campaigns. As I
see it, both the Church and the state would be the better for this
outcome.
In the articles that constitute the body of this symposium
each of our authors sounds a note of caution about the practice
of physician-assisted suicide. Professor Beschle criticizes the lib-
ertarian presuppositions of much of the right-to-die case law, and
argues forcefully for a more communitarian approach to the
question. John Keown examines the evidence from the Dutch
experiment with assisted suicide and concludes that where
assisted suicide is tolerated, involuntary euthanasia establishes its
foothold as well. Rev. Robert Barry, after surveying the history of
religious and secular attitudes towards suicide, argues against
assisted suicide both out of concern for the slippery slope that
troubles Keown and out of respect for the arguments developed
by Aquinas and other Christian philosophers. In his essay Arthur
Dyck subjects the reasoning in several recent assisted suicide
cases to careful scrutiny, then concludes with the sketch of an
argument against suicide. In his student article Arthur Povelones
suggests ways in which the initiative process-the principal
mechanism by which American voters have had a chance to regis-
ter their views on this issue-fails at present to function as an
effective form of law-making. He also suggests ways in which ini-
tiative processes might be improved. We are keenly aware of how
much more would need to be said about assisted suicide if our
study of it here pretented to completeness. We hope, however,
that what our authors have said here contributes to the current
national debate on this important topic.
